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ABSTRACT 
 
Since world war II there have been two quite distinct phases of world growth. In about 
1965, a long slowdown set in which has still not ended. Robert Brenner (2002, 2003) has 
re-ignited the debate about its causes, claiming that nothing in either present or past 
economic theory explains it. He argues for a ‘third explanation’, alternative both to the 
profit-share hypothesis which dominates today, and the rising output-capital ratio account 
associated with Marx and Kalecki. 
Empirically, the evidence overwhelmingly shows the output-capital ratio is a dominant 
cause of postwar movements in the US profit rate; thus what Brenner maintains is 
theoretically impossible, is empirically true. The paper dissects this contradiction which, 
if economics proceeded scientifically, would lead to a radical critique of its own 
paradigm, but has instead led it to suppress and ignore the only coherent alternative. 
The paper shows Brenner’s rejection of the Marx-Kalecki framework arises because his 
theoretical paradigm, adapted uncritically from his critics, cannot allow for the effect of 
falling prices on capital stocks. His own ‘third explanation’ is incompatible with this 
same framework and can be sustained only by understanding it as the mechanism behind, 
or ultimate cause of, the movement of the output-capital ratio in price terms. 
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WHAT MAKES THE US PROFIT RATE FALL? 
Introduction 
Historians and economists agree that growth is a decisive indicator of the state of any 
economy, and most recognise that since world war II there have been two quite distinct 
phases of world growth. In about 1965, after twenty years of rapid expansion (the ‘long 
boom’ or ‘golden age’), a long period of slow growth set in which has still not ended. 
This tectonic economic shift has historic significance. It marks the boundary between the 
60s and the 80s. It produced 1968; it provoked the revolutions and coups of the 70s, and 
then it brought Thatcher and Reagan. Arguably, it led to the rise of the US 
neoconservatives and the Bush administration. Explaining why it happened is thus one of 
the principal challenges facing political economy. 
The 70s and 80s saw a major debate about its causes, started by critics of the market 
economy such as Mandel (1974), Armstrong et al (1984), and others. Writers such as 
Maddison (1982) continue to document the phenomenon, but more or less empirically. 
Although the period of slow growth is still with us – so much that many have forgotten 
the world was ever different – discussion around its causes has fizzled out.  
Robert Brenner (2002, 2003) has re-ignited this debate, showing that almost nothing in 
contemporary economic theory explains this long slowdown. If he had gone no further, 
there would be little to differ about; however he does go farther, claiming that nothing in 
past economic theory explains it either. 
My main aim in this paper is to show that this last claim is misplaced. Earlier theoretical 
frameworks do exist, most notably the account of the determinants of the profit rate to be 
found in the work of Karl Marx, that furnish perfectly valid explanations not merely for 
the growth slowdown of the 1970s but for the three previous such slowdowns – that of 
1815-1853, of 1873-1893, and of 1917-1939. 
This leads to my second aim, which is to lay bare an intellectual paradox at the heart of 
Brenner’s work. Along with the contemporary economists of whom he is so critical, he 
rejects an entire body of theory which empirically provides a perfectly successful 
explanation for the facts, on purely theoretical grounds – supplied by very contemporary 
economists whose theories he seeks to replace. Having refuted the economists with the 
evidence of history, he proceeds to refutes history with the evidence of the economists. 
This shows he has seriously underestimated their errors, and my third aim is to prove this 
places his own contribution in mortal danger. Modern economics is more than just false: 
it is a conspiracy against truth. It does not just fail to explain reality: it is organised to 
reject those who can. Brenner’s explanation is not logically compatible with it. In joining 
its chorus of rejection, he invites it to suppress his own ideas. 
Economics has to be rescued from the economists. To this end any serious critic must 
recover the economic heritage which the economists have buried. The same discipline 
that has happily shredded the insights of Keynes, of Marx, and countless lesser-known 
figures, will ingest the Brenners of this world, chew up their ideas and spit them out, and 
in twenty years time no-one will have heard of them except as a footnote to ‘past errors’. 
The purpose of this article is to ensure that, in spite of Brenner, that does not happen. 
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What explains the profit rate? 
Chart 1: US profit rate and US profit share 
Index: 1965=100 
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For sources see note at end of this article. 
All series are indexed to the year 1965=100 so that their variations can be compared. 
 
I begin with the body of theory which Brenner – rightly, in my view – sets out to refute. 
What he objects to is the idea that both long-run and short-run growth slowdows originate 
in falling profits, caused by a rising share of wages in output, and hence a diminishing 
share of profits in output. He summarises this as follows: 
‘Marxists and radicals have joined liberals and conservatives in explaining 
the long downturn as a ‘supply-side’ crisis, resulting from a squeeze on 
profits, reflecting pressure on capital from labour that is ‘too strong’. 
(Brenner 2002:12) 
This leads him to focus on the profit rate – the ratio between profits and invested capital 
stock, sometimes called the return on capital (ROC). Because the purpose of this article is 
to re-assess his theory of this variable, I leave out any wider economic discussion about 
whether it really is the main determinant of growth. I assume as common ground his view 
that it is ‘not only the basic indicator but also the central determinant of the system’s 
health’1 and, via its impact on investment, the main factor accounting for growth. 
I agree with him that the issue is not the level of wages but their share in output, and this 
is obviously central. A rise in wages will not reduce the profit share unless output rises 
more slowly.2 This is the underlying idea behind what he calls ‘Malthusian’ theories 
                                                 
1
 Brenner (2002:6)) 
2
 as Brenner makes clear (xxxx, xxxx) in replies to critics. 
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which stress the failure of productivity to rise in line with wages, rather than excessive 
wage rises per se. 
Brenner reserves the phrase ‘supply side’ for such theories. The rest of economics uses 
this phrase with a different meaning, so I will use the more neutral term ‘profit-share’ 
theory. This covers all theses which hold that growth gets choked off when wages grow 
faster than output, including those which Brenner calls ‘Malthusian’ and also the original 
profit-squeeze hypothesis which enjoyed prominence in the 1970s, for example as an 
explanation for the crisis of that time in the UK.3 
Chart 2: US actual and maximum profit rate (‘output-capital’ ratio) 
index: 1965=100 
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tba re-entitle ‘maximum profit rate (‘output-capital’ ratio) in graph itself 
In common with other writers,4 I will deal with the profit rate in the whole (US) economy 
and not just manufacturing, to which Brenner attaches more emphasis. Since 1965 US 
capital has migrated into services, and manufacturing worldwide has migrated to the 
global South. Capital may thus be making less profits in US manufacturing because it can 
make more profits somewhere else. The falling profit rate in manufacturing in the 
advanced countries does reflect the global trend in profits as a whole, but may in part 
express a redistribution of profit between branches of production; I therefore focus on the 
most general indicator of profitability – the profit rate in the whole of the USA, the most 
powerful economy in the world. 
It may be thought that this is the source of my differences with Brenner. This is not so. I 
do not take issue with Brenner for his focus on manufacturing, and my case is just as 
valid for the profit rate there as for the whole economy. However, my argument will be 
clearest, and most general, if I can set aside all extraneous factors which might arise not 
from the movement of the economy as a whole, but one part of it. 
                                                 
3
 Cf Glynn and Sutcliffe (1972) 
4
 cf Dumenil and Levy(1993) 
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I now return to the profit-share theory. This is trivially easy to demolish by misstating it, 
for example to interpret it as meaning that nothing else affects the profit rate. When, for 
example, we say that gravity causes objects to fall, we do not mean they never do 
anything else or that no other circumstance can make them move downwards. We need to 
refine, and test, the idea that the movements in the profit share are the ‘main cause’ of 
movements in the profit rate.  
Any alternative approach should of course be tested in the same way, and not by reducing 
it to an unacceptably simplified form. For example the idea that the ratio of output to 
capital dominates profit rate movements, abusively labelled ‘fundamentalist’ by Fine – a 
designation perpetuated by Brenner – cannot be reduced to the idea that the profit rate 
falls for ever,5 or that nothing else has any effect on the profit rate.  
I will therefore try to formulate the idea that the profit share is a cause that dominates over 
all other causes. As Brenner notes, all sources of variation in the profit rate can be 
partitioned into two. The profit rate is defined as 
 
K
Π
 (1) 
where Y means annual output, K means accumulated capital stock, and Π means annual 
profits. Dividing top and bottom by Y gives 
 
K
Y
Y
Π
×  (2) 
The first term is the profit share. The second is, basically, the largest possible profit rate. 
If wages were zero, profits would be equal to Y/K. This gives us 
 Rate of profit = Profit share × Maximum profit rate 
Brenner adapts a different terminology from the economists, conceding to them a 
confusion. In this terminology, 
Rate of Profit = Profit share × Output-capital Ratio 
This calculation effectively divides all possible causes of the rate of profit into two great 
camps. As it stands it is, of course, only an algebraic formula. It is only a way of thinking 
about the profit rate and has no necessary causal implications. Nevertheless, discussions 
in the last century have invested it with an almost scriptural significance, as rival camps 
apply mathematical arts to demonstrate the primacy of one or other term in it. 
One of the main things I want to establish is that this debate long ago parted company 
from the most basic principle of science, which is that facts come before theory. As it 
stands, the formula is just that – a formula. Writing it in symbols does not give it magical 
qualities. Before making any theoretical deductions from it, we first have to study the 
actual behaviour of the terms in it, to assess the evidence that the possible causal relations 
it implies do, or do not hold, in reality.  
Before doing that, one last clarification. Brenner’s preference for the term ‘output-capital 
ratio’ lays him open to a confusion, which is not the central problem but nevertheless bars 
the way to solving it. He consents to a well-known but misleading error in his discussion 
with his critics in allowing them to identify Y/K with the productivity of capital.6  
                                                 
5
 This caricature is advanced for example by Laibman (xxxx) 
6Thus Brenner seems to assume that any explanation rooted in a falling output-capital ratio must suppose 
that the productivity of capital is falling. This hobbles his response to trivially false criticism. Against 
Zacharias (Brenner 2002:p36) he writes “My argument emphatically does not, contra Zacharias, entail a 
rising real Output–Capital ratio (rising capital productivity).” But he has nothing to fear. A rising output-
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Actually, productivity, as it figures in the work of the economists whose work Brenner 
discusses, has no necessary relation to the output-capital ratio. By the term ‘capital 
productivity’ these economists all mean the ratio between output and consumed capital 
(raw materials plus depreciation). Not only is the term hardly ever applied to invested 
capital, but it is highly contestable that it can be so applied, as is testified by a long, 
arduous, and famous debate in economics.7 
It is perfectly possible for the productivity of consumed capital to decline whilst the ratio 
of output to invested capital systematically rises. This happens when, for example, 
entrepreneurs invest in machinery that saves on raw materials, or if the machinery itself 
wears out more and more slowly. In the ultimate case of a machine that never wears out 
and consumes no raw materials (eg a perfect computer) the physical productivity of 
consumed capital would be infinite because nothing is consumed, but the output-capital 
ratio could fall without limit. 
This point is emphatically registered by Marx as has been noted by, for example Fine and 
by Saad-Filho. It does not, it should be noted, vindicate him, which is why I don’t think 
these authors have actually settled any important dispute. It does not dispose of the main 
argument against Marx’s analysis – that although the physical amount of invested capital 
systematically rises, its price falls due to technical progress. 
Nevertheless, the confusion casts such a pall over the main discussion that it has to be 
cleared up before proceeding to the main issue. 
The facts of the US profit rate 
To proceed to the main issue: given equation (2), clearly, three outcomes are empirically 
possible. First, we may find that the profit share accounts for nearly all the variation in the 
profit rate, and that any residual movement is insignificant, relatively small, or has little or 
no additional explanatory value after the effect of the profit share has been removed. In 
that case we can say that the profit share is a dominant cause of movements in the profit 
rate. 
We may find alternatively that the output-capital ratio accounts for nearly all the 
variation, and that any residual is insignificant, relatively small, or has little or no 
additional explanatory value after this effect has been removed. In that case we can say 
that the output-capital ratio is a dominant cause of movements in the profit rate. 
There is a third possibility: we could find that neither variable on its own can be 
discounted, that each plays some necessary role, and neither is a dominant cause. In that 
case, as discussed later on, the analytical separation of the profit rate into two mutually 
exclusive causes is not particularly useful, and we should look for some third explanation. 
Charts 1 and 2 allow us to verify which of these three alternatives actually holds for the 
case of the US profit rate. Chart 1 shows what would have happened if the only thing 
affecting the profit rate was the profit share – that is, if the output-capital ratio (maximum 
                                                                                                                                            
capital ratio is simply not the same as rising capital productivity. Zacharias’ case can be dismissed by 
recognising only this, but Brenner does not do, apparently for fear that the mere mention of a rising output-
capital ratio will lead to the Sin of Malthus. 
7
 namely, the Capital Controversy (see Harcourt xxx). The difficulty with fixed capital is the principal reason 
that Piero Sraffa (xxxx) introduced the concept of joint production, which he and the physicalist school 
needed in order to reduce fixed capital to circulating capital, by supposing that a machine each year jointly 
produces its product, and a vintage of itself. See Pasinetti (xxxx), Dumenil and Levy (tba), Freeman (2005). 
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profit rate) were held constant. Chart 2 shows what would have happened if the profit 
share had no effect at all – that is, if the profit share is held constant. 
Note that because of formula (2) each of these charts is also the residual of the other. 
Thus, chart 1 shows the variation which remains, after that due to the output-capital ratio 
(maximum profit rate) has been removed. Chart 2, less obviously, shows the variation 
which remains after that due to the profit share has been removed. This is because the 
grey line in that chart, which shows the maximum profit rate, would be the same for any 
constant profit share. 
If the profit share was a dominant or even significant cause of the boom and bust, the grey 
line in chart 1 should exhibit the same general features as the actual profit rate: a sharp 
rise, followed by a long decline. It exhibits neither. The recovery in the profit rate from 
1933 to 1943 has clearly nothing to do with the profit share, which over this period even 
fell slightly. As for the decline, between the high point of 1943 and the low point of 1980 
the profit rate fell by 60 percentage points while the profit share fell by only 20 per cent, 
accounting for at most one third of this movement. If we take the start point most 
favourable to the profit share hypothesis, between 1965 and 1980 – the period which 
occupies Brenner’s attention the most – the profit rate fell by 40 percentage points and the 
profit share by half this much. 
Almost all of the recovery, and between a half and two-thirds of the main thing Brenner 
wants us to explain – the postwar decline in the profit rate – is unaccounted for by the 
profit share. For those who consider regression analysis a useful tool, a regression of the 
profit rate against the profit share between 1929 and 1965 yields an R2 of 0.008, that is, 
99.2 per cent of the variation in the profit rate is unexplained by the profit share. Over the 
whole of 1929 to 1996 R2 is 0.193, that is, 80.7 per cent of the variation in the profit rate is 
unexplained by the profit share. 
Turning now to the residual variation: if the profit-share were a dominant cause of the 
observed long-term changes in the profit rate, then when we eliminate this cause, what 
remains should be negligible or random – that is, the grey line in chart 2 would either be 
flat, or its movement would be unrelated to the movement of the profit rate. 
It is not flat, and it clearly is related to the profit rate. On both grounds, the profit share 
cannot be considered dominant. It does not explain the observed variation, and when it is 
removed, the residual is not negligible. 
This is in complete contrast with the output-capital ratio, which on its own accounts for 
91.9 per cent of the variation in the profit rate between 1929 and 1965, and 75.7 per cent 
of the variation between 1929 and 1996. With the sole exception of the five years of 
decline from 1965 to 1970, it accounts for almost the whole variation in the profit rate 
since 1929. The key, broad historical movements in the profit rate are present whether or 
not the profit share varies: in particular an extremely strong upward swing in the profit 
rate from 1933 to 1943, followed by a prolonged decline until 1981 interrupted between 
1958 and 1965,8 followed by a shallow recovery bringing profit rates only back up to 
their 1958 level. 
What of the residual after the effect of the output-capital ratio is discounted? 
Symmetrically, this is the grey line in chart 1. Essentially this shows random fluctuations 
about a trend declining at a rate of 30% over sixty years, that is 0.5 per cent per year. This 
                                                 
8
 Brenner concentrates on the decline from 1965. But as can be seen, aside from minor fluctuations the profit 
rate declined continuously from 1943 with the exception of the 7-year rise of 1958-1965. Any verdict on the 
decline must be set in this context: the problem is not merely to explain what happened after this limited 
seven-year recovery, but to ask what happened over the entire Kondratieff up- and downswing from 1943. 
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trend has no explanatory value whatsoever in relation to the key historical phenomenon, 
which is a rise followed by a long fall. 
Thus the facts offer very strong confirmation for an alternative hypothesis, namely 
Marx’s much-maligned argument that the long-term rise in the organic composition of 
capital – to which the output-capital bears a simple and direct relation – is the most 
significant cause of the long-term fall in the profit rate. The empirically dominant cause of 
all long term movements in the US profit rate between 1929 and 2000, that is, the whole 
period for which records have been kept, is the ratio between output and capital stock. 
The elephant in the dining room: why does the output-
capital ratio fall? 
We now turn to the second main point of our article. According to the economists upon 
whose theoretical framework Brenner rests his work, what we have just empirically 
shown is theoretically impossible. The reason is a justly-famous theorem due to Nobuo 
Okishio (1961) which shows that if the capitalists innovate in such a way as to reduce 
their input costs (henceforth ‘cost-saving technical innovation’), the profit rate must rise 
provided that the real wage is constant. Brenner endorses this conclusion extremely early 
in his article, without first examining the empirical evidence, in a long footnote dedicated 
to rejecting the account provided by Marx, the principal architect of the view that the 
profit rate is dominated by movements in capital stock (Brenner 2002:12ff; emphasis in 
original except where indicated) 
[I]f, as Marx himself seemed to take for granted, the capitalists are assumed, 
in response to competition, to adapt technical changes that raise their own 
rate of profit by reducing their total cost (labour plus capital, or direct and 
indirect labour) per commodity, it seems intuitively obvious that the ultimate 
result of their innovation, when it is generally adopted in their line, can only 
be to reduce the exchange value of the goods produced in their line and thus, 
directly or indirectly, to reduce the exchange value of the wage, and thus to 
raise the average rate of profit, given again the (Marxian) assumption that the 
real wage remains constant. It certainly cannot be to reduce the rate of 
profit.9 Formal proofs of this result can be found in Okishio [1961] as well as 
in Roemer [1978a, 1978b] 
There is only one problem. What Okishio says cannot happen, does happen. The 
statement that ‘the ultimate result of their innovation…certainly cannot be to reduce the 
rate of profit’ is, unfortunately, demonstrably false. As with many of the most central 
scientific advances of the age, the ‘intuitively obvious’ happens to factually untrue. 
Indeed since the theorem must apply for the special case of a zero real wage, it applies to 
the maximum profit rate – that is, the output-capital ratio. Hence, if Okishio’s theorem is 
right, the output-capital ratio cannot be a cause at all – let alone a dominant cause. Indeed 
the output-capital ratio cannot possibly fall.10 
Eppur si muove. Actually, the output-capital ratio does indeed fall, for considerable 
periods of history, as chart 2 shows. Moreover when it falls, the actual profit rate moves 
with it, as chart 2 also shows. And even if is not accepted that the output-capital ratio is 
                                                 
9
 The emphasis here is mine – AF 
10
 unless, of course, the capitalists behave irrationally, by innovating in such a way as to raise costs. 
However, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for this, nor does Brenner suggest it. 
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the dominant determinant of the profit rate, it remains the case that the Okishio theorem 
predicts a historical tendency – an inevitable rise in the output-capital ratio – which 
manifestly does not occur. 
A truly radical critique of contemporary theory would have cut a path straight through 
this central contradiction, concluding the necessity of discarding contemporary theory 
along with its erroneous reconstruction of Marx lock, stock and theorem. Confronted with 
the fact that theory rules out Marx’s account as something which ‘certainly cannot reduce 
the profit rate’ in a situation where, empirically, it does indeed reduce the profit rate, 
ought to lead directly to the conclusion drawn by researchers in the Temporal Single 
System School (TSSI),11 that this theory must have misunderstood Marx’s account and 
that we should carefully re-read and reconstruct what Marx actually said, since the most 
obvious explanation is that we put to the test some different theory, other than the theory 
which made the correct prediction. 
This is the only possible basis for a scientific alternative that can lead out of the blind 
alley in which contemporary economics finds itself. The central intellectual contradiction 
of Brenner’s work is that he does not follow the scientific path (and in so doing, 
significantly discredits the historian’s craft). Instead he sets out down the third road of 
trying to establish a ‘new’ dominant cause alternative to both the profit-share and the 
output-capital ratio. 
My alternative approach to the long downturn takes as its point of departure 
the results of the foregoing critique…my point of departure is thus 
simultaneously that capitalism tends to develop the productive forces to an 
unprecedented degree, and that it tends to do so in a destructive, because 
unplanned and competitive, manner. (Brenner 2002:23, emphasis in original) 
In taking as point of departure a theoretical critique, rather than empirical reality, Brenner 
unfortunately follows contemporary economics down the path it has followed since 1905 
when Bortkiewicz first reinterpreted Marx as a general equiligrium theorist. The 
mechanism behind the debate itself is the following: economists discount a priori what 
we actually see in reality. They deny that it is empirically possible for the output-capital 
ratio to operate as a cause, on purely theoretical grounds. Brenner not only accepts this: 
sadly, he gives in to it. He does not even study the actual empirical evolution of the 
output-capital ratio with the minor exception of a couple of paragraphs halfway through 
his article, which I assess later.  
Instead, he sets out in search of alternative explanations which circumvent the central 
issue, namely the observed behaviour of the output-capital ratio. By this route he does 
arrive at a genuinely innovative account of which the rational core is the idea that the 
profit rate falls as a result of the declining prices of capital goods. But this merely returns 
him to the central paradox; actually, his alternative explanation can only be sustained by 
rejecting the entire theoretical framework within which Okishio’s theorem is situated, 
which framework is the ‘point of departure’ of his analysis. 
The reason is that the output-capital ratio does indeed fall – in price terms. But, as we 
shall also see, the fundamental theoretical method employed by Brenner’s critics – and 
accepted by Brenner – denies that the output-capital ratio in price terms can differ from 
the output-capital ratio in physical terms. The entire folie à deux of the debate which has 
followed Brenner’s contribution arises from this basic confusion. 
                                                 
11
 Cf Freeman and Carchedi (1995) and Freeman, Kliman and Wells (2004); also www.iwgvt.org  
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Time and money: why the price rate of profit is lower 
than the physical rate, when prices are falling 
The preceding argument brings us to the main point, which is elementary but vital: the 
rate of profit is an ratio of price, not physical, magnitudes. Therefore, if in the price ratio 
Y/K, K rises in price terms more rapidly than Y, even though in physical terms it rises 
more slowly, then the maximum profit rate in price terms can fall, and under the 
appropriate circumstances will fall, even when in physical terms does not. 
Why should K rise more rapidly than Y? And why should falling prices affect the 
outcome? At first sight this is difficult to understand how this can make a difference, even 
to a person prepared to abandon the unfounded theoretical prejudice that the price rate 
must be the same as the physical rate: to be sure, the price of invested capital goods 
changes at a rate which is different from the price of currently-produced output and so the 
profit rate in price terms is different from the physical rate. But surely, if anything the 
price of capital goods (K) is falling faster than that of currently produced goods (Y)? 
This omits a decisive point, which Brenner himself understands, and which is the core of 
his argument but which, blinded either by the Okishio theorem, or by the pious esteem in 
which it is held by the economists, he fails to incorporate into his general theoretical 
framework. If the price of invested goods falls, the capitalists lose money. This reduces 
output. 
Therefore any fall ∆K in price of K constitutes not merely a reduction in the denominator 
of Y/K but is also a deduction from the numerator. The money profit rate is not simply 
pyY/pkK 
where pY is the price of output, and pk the price of capital goods. It is 
Kp
pKYp
K
KY ∆−
 
where ∆K is the loss of money experienced by the capitalists as a result of the decline in 
the value of their invested or, as Brenner terms it ‘sunk’ capital.12 
The the discussion among the economists into which Brenner has entered assumes that 
the profit rate in price terms cannot possibly be different from the profit rate in terms of 
physical magnitudes. This is not a theoretical accident. It is an outcome of the very same 
approach to the profit rate which informs the Okishio theorem and which informs the 
Marxist tradition since Paul Sweezy, which in turn accepts the very same fundamental 
premise of pre-monetarist neoclassical theory that Keynes so systematically demolished 
in the General Theory. This approach, general equilibrium, theoretically entails that price 
cannot matter because it assumes away a priori the impact of any movement in prices. 
The equilibrium approach dictates that we should suppose all prices, profits and indeed all 
economic magnitudes, are given by the levels which they would attain, if all economic 
movement ceased – in this case, if prices stopped falling. 
                                                 
12
 It may be supposed that the above predicts that K will fall, rather than rise. However there are two sources 
of change in K. One is the price mechanism just described and the other is accumulation. K falls in price 
terms by K∆pK but rises through investment by an amount KpK determined by the capitalists propensity to 
invest. The final outcome is the resultant of these two effects: 
KKK
KY
pKKpKp
pKYp
∆−∆+
∆−
 
If investment outstrips the fall in prices, as is the case except during an exceptionally deep recession (as 
actually took place from 1929-1937) then K in price terms rises and the output-capital ratio falls. 
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If prices are fluctuating randomly, this does not matter. But if – as is the case – they are 
falling in a secular way as a result of technical change, equilibrium theory predicts a 
systematically higher profit rate than is actually observed. Indeed, it predicts – as Okishio 
indeed proves – that the maximum profit rate will rise without limit, under circumstances 
when the price profit rate is perfectly capable of falling, and does indeed fall. 
To be precise, it predicts that regardless of money and prices, the maximum profit rate 
will simply be equal to the ratio of the physical magnitudes of Y and K and the actual 
profit rate will be the ratio of the physical magnitudes of Π and K. 
The core insight in Brenner’s analysis of the impact of competition is that the falling 
prices of ‘sunk’ capital – which he attributes to increased competition, but for which 
technical innovation is surely the most general underlying cause – impacts on the profit 
rate. However, this insight can be preserved only by the most thorough-going theoretical 
break with the equilibrium method, here concentrated in demanding of economics the 
recognition that the temporal factor pk∆K is decisive in determining the actual, observed, 
money rate of profit. 
Is moral depreciation an illusion? 
It may be argued that the the accountants’ practice is an arbitrary whim and that different 
depreciation rule would eliminate the output reduction brought on by technical change. In 
fact this is not so as the following considerations show. What must a capitalist do, in 
order to run a business? She advances a sum of money and buys things – machinery, 
buildings, equipment, raw materials, and so on. These are purchased at the price of the 
time, not the price of the future. What money sums must the capitalist recover from sales 
before a profit can be made? The money advanced in order to purchase the inputs. The 
denominator in the profit rate is the capital originally advanced, which is a millstone that 
does not get ground down until and unless someone, somewhere, actually pays for it. 
Thus whereas the physical quantities involved are untouched by such changes in price, 
money profits are not. It is therefore entirely wrong to identify physical surplus with 
money profit. Once prices start changing, the two are simply not the same. 
Once production has taken place and time has elapsed, productivity advances will make it 
possible to purchase new inputs in the future at lower prices. But the capitalist didn’t buy 
the inputs in the future. She bought them in the past. And she must recover what she paid, 
not some fictitious sum that she would have paid, had she been able to take a train to the 
future, buy the cheaper inputs, and then return to the present together with the inputs, and 
feed them into the assembly line which she presumably also bought in the future. 
It is even clearer if one supposes the money was borrowed although this does not change 
the substance of the matter. Suppose a banker lends the capitalist £100,000 to buy 
computers which, by the time the loan is due to be repaid, could have been purchased for 
£50,000. What banker would concede that, since the goods purchased with the money are 
now worth only £50,000, half the loan can be forgotten? The bank lent the capitalist 
money, not computers: and that’s what the banker wants back. 
The capitalists can, it is true, wrongly estimate the impact of depreciation, and this 
frequently happens, especially when the company has an interest in doing so – as did 
Enron, for example. Indeed, one function of a crash is to reveal the ‘true’ values of 
businesses buried under mountains of suspect paper. But the very fact that such crashes 
occur, and above all the fact that when they do occur, creditors suddenly become 
uninterested in fraudulent depreciation and begin a very energetical search to ascertain the 
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exact true value of the company’s invested capital, is the clearest proof that this is a real 
phenomenon of capitalism and not at all an accountant’s fiction. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the full effect of moral depreciation is rarely known 
immediately and therefore, for some period of time – at least the duration of the business 
cycle and perhaps even longer – official figures for output and capital stock13 are out of 
step with reality. This is one of the main reasons that it is difficult to study the true causes 
of movements in the profit rate over short periods and that the picture is much clearer 
over reasonable historical periods of time. 
Companies can and do write down their capital in different ways and they do get it 
wrong. The key point is they do not escape the impact of price falls on the mass of their 
profit in this way; they merely cause this impact to be expressed in a different way. A 
classic very long run example is the British ship-building industry,14 which refused for a 
century to write down the value of its landed property – a critical element of 
infrastructural investment in shipbuilding which requires deep harbours – on the grounds 
that land does not depreciate. Their Korean competitors invested in artificial harbours – 
lowering the world value of what was hitherto a monopoly input to ship production. 
During its decline, British shipbuilding declared record profits and consistently figured 
among the profitable British industries. The true state of affairs revealed itself in its 
systematic loss of market share and finally became inescapable – as is often the case – at 
the point of bankruptcy. Only finally in this historical reckoning was it finally discovered 
that land has no intrinsic value at all, that the assets of the shipbuilders had become 
worthless, and that the companies had been decapitalised without anyone admitting it. 
Thus, the need to deduct the depreciation of capital from profits is not some statistical or 
accounting artefact but a defining and irreducible feature of capitalist production. 
Brenner’s perspicacity as a historian shows up in the fact that he recognises this, noting 
that the impact of competition on existing investment is to impose forced losses on the 
capitalists that have ‘sunk’ capital into their investments in outmoded technology. What 
he must do, if this insight is to stand the test of time, is rise to the task of integrating it into 
a more general theoretical understanding. This is the problem that has to be overcome. 
Summary: what happens when investments lose their 
value? 
What, actually, is profit? The accountants are very clear about this and history, we have 
seen, is on the side of the accountants. Profit is the difference between the money value of 
a business at the beginning of a given period and its money value at the end, including of 
course any money that the owner has withdrawn from the business. 
If the investments of the business rise or fall in value for any reason at all, the profit of the 
business is correspondingly increased or diminished. If for example I am in the business 
                                                 
13
 Which is, incidentally, depreciated on a different basis from that undertaken by the capitalists and different 
yet again from that imposed by the tax authorities. Capitalist accountancy factors in moral depreciation, and 
writes down goods over periods generally much less than their physical lifetime. The national accountants 
make a correction for this with the perpetual inventory method for capital stock, which attempts more 
accurately to include equipment that is still functioning but has been written down completely in company 
accounts. Paradoxically they do not apply the same correction the capitalists’ estimate of output. This means 
that the output measure in the national accounts is out of phase with the capital stock measure, in that it 
includes the impact of depreciation earlier. The result is probably that the profit rate is to some extent 
understated during periods of rapid technical change. 
14
 Johnman, L. and Hugh Murphy (2002) 
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of making computer equipment, and if – like CISCO during the crash of 2000-01 – I have 
laid out $3bn of semiconductors to make them with, and if the price of semiconductors 
falls by 50 per cent, then I must write down these losses in my accounts before I declare 
my profits. This is a general law: a fall in the value of invested capital is deducted before 
profits are declared. Any other claim is literally fraudulent – people go to jail for doing it. 
But what causes the price of semiconductors to fall? Of course there may be any number 
of immediate causes – the construction of a new plant, overcapacity, a failure of the tacit 
oligopoly which is well-known to regulate semiconductor prices, a sudden collapse in 
demand due to reduced consumer purchases of computers. It is a mistake, however, to 
identify these immediate causes with what underlies them, namely, inexorable technical 
progress in refining and endlessly improving the process of semiconductor production. 
In short, the cause of the decline in the profit rate is technical progress. This is the 
awkward, ‘intuitively difficult’, ideologically unacceptable conclusion against which 
economic theory has in its total effect been organised more or less since the time of Marx. 
It is the idea which Marx himself notes is the most difficult idea for scientific economic 
theory to accept. It is the idea from which all but the most morally incorruptible (or 
foolhardy) economic theorists withdraw, once the scale, extent, and socially profoundity 
of the opposition to it is made clear to them by one or other of the many devices at the 
disposal of polite intellectual society to secure recantation or compliance – the closing of 
all doors to careers, systematic refusal to publish on a succession of more or less spurious 
grounds, the rejection and ridicule of peers, the endless repetition of insulting and abusive 
designations (‘fundamentalist’), the strange forgetfulness to which all sophisticated 
economists fall prey when it comes to the citation or even the study of any ideas other 
than their own – all these are of course present no threat to life, liberty or even happiness, 
and so they will not be found in any catalogue of political or human abuse. But their 
purpose is much more subtle and, ultimately, devastating to human survival: they 
function as a gigantic ideological enterprise whose sole final result is to ensure that people 
do not understand that the greatest threat to the capitalism is – capitalism itself. 
Three observations are pertinent: 
(1) Technical progress itself reduces the monetary magnitude of profits through its 
effects on previous investments, as Brenner recognises. 
(2) This ‘moral depreciation’, as Marx termed it, is not caused by physical 
deterioration or ‘material depreciation’ and should be distinguished from it. It is 
entirely a result of lower prices which are in turn a result of technical progress. 
(3) The greater the technical progress, the greater the reduction in profits. 
A series of further conclusions follow. 
First, whilst the impact of competition as such – particularly international competition – 
does not ultimately produce the fall in the output-capital ratio and with it the profit rate, at 
certain historical points it clearly played a decisive immediate role. Notwithstanding the 
points at the start of this section, I think Brenner is right to give this attention as a 
particular historical cause in the 1960s.  
Difficulties arise, however, if we make competition the primary cause. As historians we 
run up against a problem: the same phenomenon took place in at least two previous 
periods of history, namely 1873-1893 and 1922-1937. But arguably during 1922 and 
certainly during 1873-1893, the principal feature of the market régime was monopoly.  
How, then, can competition explain these previous cycles of decline? Of course, the 
‘general’ fact that technical progress provokes the decline in the profit rate is insufficient 
to explain why at particular points in history, the profit rate should rise more or less 
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rapidly and at others, it should decline for a long time. A more general historical theory 
would apply Marx’s understanding of the impact of technical progress on growth, I think, 
more or less in the same way that physics deals with gravity. It would have to study the 
particular circumstances which result in this factor expressing itself openly at particular 
times. The problem with Brenner’s elevation of competition into a general cause is that, 
ceteris paribus, one would like a theory that explains each and every Kondratieff 
downswing, not just one of them. 
Second, a simple empirical calculation explains why chart 2 has the form which it does, 
and shows why, in general, the temporal effect of falling investment prices is likely to 
dominate over profit share effects. Empirically, capital stock is rarely less than eight times 
bigger than output. But it follows that even a one per cent reduction in the value of 
investments, will result in an eight per cent loss of output. Indeed, the greater the 
accumulated stock, the greater the temporal effect.  
This is precisely why, when the accumulation of stock has risen as high as it had by the 
sixties, it became more or less inevitable that technical innovation, above all when 
concentrated in the goods that have accumulated as productive resources, will eat into the 
profits arising from enhanced productivity to such a degree as to offset them more or less 
completely. The reduction in profit rate due to this phenomenon is absolutely sufficient to 
cancel out or indeed reverse the positive impact on the profit rate of the original fall in the 
price of invested capital stock, and this is clearly not a negligible or discountable effect as 
equilibrium theory would have us believe, but one of the most fundamental mechanisms 
of the economy. 
Third, does the above imply that the rate of profit must fall for ever? This extreme form 
of Marx’s conception of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall has played a 
disproportionate role in Marxist discussions and has to some degree contributed to the 
scepticism with which it has been received particularly in US circles.15 This tendency 
within Marxism dates back to a very specific discussion, which took place among 
Russian Marxists in the 1920s.16 A catastrophist view emerged according to which the 
collapse of capitalist was imminent and driven by automatic economic mechanisms, a 
view which Marx himself certainly never held and which cannot be found in his writings. 
This catastrophist view vanished from the mainstream but survived in an admittedly 
millenarian form into the second half of the century, where it found the strongest 
theoretical currency in those places where the practical prospects for political change 
were weakest, namely, the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Actually, the profit rate can be and was restored by a simple but destructive mechanism, 
namely disaccumulation in value terms. That this is what really happened is clear from 
the timing of the ‘bounceback’ after the great depression, which took place over the 
period 1937-1943. This occurs when the economy either contracts, or runs at a 
sufficiently low rate that the capital stock depreciates faster than it is replenished. This 
may happen through a more or less catastrophic collapse of personal consumption, and 
accounts for the 1933-37 partial reconstitution of the US profit rate. A second form of the 
same mechanism is the creation of extra non-investment demand which raises economic 
activity back to levels approaching full capacity, but maintains private (profit-
appropriating) investment at low levels so that disaccumulation proceeds without the 
socially-disruptive consequences of very low levels of economic activity. 
                                                 
15
 cf Shaikh tba, probably the most apocalyptic of a number of attempts to demonstrate that the profit rate 
never stops falling. 
16
 See Day (1981) 
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This is the rational kernel in the somewhat unjustly maligned account of Luxemburg, 
which notes the key role played by war – obviously one of the most unproductive 
possible use of social resources. To the extent that war expenditure simply uses up output 
or, being state expenditure, does not place the relevant investment within the sphere of 
private capital, it plays the same role as pure slump. 
In summary the profit rate can be restored – but only through the kind of profound crisis 
seen in thirties, when recession is so deep and so long that accumulation itself halts and 
the value of accumulated capital stock is permitted to fall, contrary to all the natural 
tendencies of capitalism, can lay the basis for a recovery. Even this is not enough, since 
the same crisis also drastically reduces output and further drastic measures are required – 
eg war, fascism, etc – to bring about the sharp upswing seen between 1933 and 1944. 
Is a ‘third explanation’ possible? 
We hold the thread of an unravelling cloth – the fabric of the post-Marxist, equilibrium-
centred reconstruction of classical economics. This single fact, the impact of the 
depreciation of capital on profits, is the economic equivalent of the Lorentz contraction in 
relativistic physics. The distinction between a scientific and a theological approach lies in 
whether it is treated as an irritating anomaly to be worried about at another time, or 
recognised for what it is: the fundamental flaw in the modern economic conception of 
price and profit. 
The task facing anyone that really wants to understand why Okishio’s theorem is 
empirically false is to follow this thread quite relentlessly, setting aside all previous 
‘received knowledge’, abandoning in the process the entire physicalist, equilibrium 
framework for understanding what profits really consist of, and all preconceived notions 
that follow from it. 
A correct scientific approach would have been to look at whether these contesting causes 
were plausible before, not after, introducing any theoretical preconceptions which rule 
out these causes – especially, and above all, since theory has systematically failed and 
must therefore be subjected to the most radical possible critique. If Brenner had done this, 
he would have been led to a different and very straightforward enquiry: how is it that the 
rate of profit in price terms can differ from the rate of profit in physical terms? 
But he does not. Having correctly, in his introduction, noted that the profit rate can be 
decomposed into profit share and capital-output ratio, he undertakes no study of the actual 
movement of these two magnitudes. 
Indeed his empirical discussion of the actual movement of the output-capital ratio is 
remarkably weak. It does not seem to appear until p101 of his article and deals only with 
the period 1965-1973, which as we have seen is the only period between the whole of 
1929-1996 during which there is a significant residual after the impact of the output-
capital ratio has been taken into account. Even then, as we have seen, the output-capital 
ratio accounts for more than half the variation, a fact that Brenner discounts by 
introducing a new definition of the profit rate used nowhere else, in terms of constant 
prices: ‘If the output-capital ratio is to express capital productivity it must be expressed in 
terms of real output compared to real capital input, in terms, that is, of constant output 
and capital stock prices.’ (Brenner 2002:101). 
But first, if this is the correct way to measure profits, why not do it throughout? Why use 
it only when dismissing an uncomfortable fact? Second, as we have already explained, 
the output-capital ratio is a money magnitude and it is in this form that it enters the 
formula for the rate of profit. Indeed, the very fact that he can calculate a physical 
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measure of it, and find that this physical measure differs from the price form, only 
emphasises that the price form itself cannot be explained by a purely physical analysis. 
Brenner does indeed wish to integrate the impact of price movements into his analysis, 
and this is clear from his discussion of the impact of prices changes on capitalists who 
have already invested massively in fixed capital. 
If this is to survive as an explanation, as noted it must be shown that price movements can 
impact on the profit rate. But as we have seen, in endorsing the approach of Okishio he 
has endorsed a theoretical framework within which no change in prices can have any 
impact on the profit rate whatsoever. Therefore, within this framework, his own 
explanation cannot hold. This is the fundamental contradiction in his article. 
Brenner believes that he can escape these paradoxes by constructing a ‘new’ explanation 
for the decline in the profit rate. Let us therefore ask what it might mean, and under what 
circumstances a third cause could be considered dominant, given that we have partitioned 
the movement of the profit rate entirely into two rival contenders for the place of 
dominant cause. 
As we have seen, the argument as to whether the profit share and output-capital ratio is a 
dominant cause arises from the formula for the profit rate, which is the product of these 
two magnitudes. This is a however a purely algebraic separation; there is no guarantee 
that it will produce meaningful results. Under what circumstances would it be meaningful 
or necessary, therefore, to produce a third, alternative explanation? Only, I argue, if 
neither the profit share nor the output-capital ratio emerged empirically as dominant 
cause. We would then have to conclude that though theoretically interesting, the division 
of causes into two great and apparently conflicting camps which is expressed in equation 
(2), is analytically insufficient to furnish useful explanations and constitutes a nothing 
more than a mathematical curiosity. In this third case, and only in this third case, the way 
is open to consider different analyses which operate in a mixed way, modifying both the 
profit share and the output-capital ratio in some interlinked manner. 
It would then make sense to investigate a great variety of alternative causes – competitive 
behaviour, market régime, entrepreneurial psychology, microeconomic behaviour, and so 
on, and determine whether, in their own right, they can explain the variation in the profit 
rate. 
If however one or other of the terms in equation (2) explains the great bulk of the 
variation in the profit rate, then any such third cause has to be linked to the relevant term, 
because if it is a valid cause, then it and the relevant term would have to be collinear, that 
is they would have to vary together. In this case, although these many interesting 
mechanisms may still be invoked to explain the variation in the profit rate, such ‘ultimate 
causes’ must operate through their effects on one or other of these two variables. The 
problem is not, then, to invoke these complex mechanisms as an alternative to 
movements in either profit share or the output-capital ratio but to show how they 
themselves cause the movements in the profit share or the output-capital ratio. 
Thus the ‘profit-share’ hypothesis in its most general form amounts to saying that all 
other causes must operate by modifying the profit share. When we put things in this way 
it is easy to see the alternative: if the output-capital ratio is a dominant cause, then all 
other causes must operate by modifying the output-capital ratio or, alternatively, must be 
the outcome of some deeper process which also causes the output-capital ratio to fall. 
As a demonstration of how this point applies in practice, consider the argument that the 
remedy for falling profits is to cut wages. As noted, the output-capital ratio is in fact the 
same as the maximum profit rate. Of course there is no lower bound to the profit rate. By 
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increasing wages far enough, the profit rate under any conditions can be reduced to zero. 
There is, however, an upper bound. The profit rate cannot be raised above the output-
capital ratio by decreasing wages. Y/K is thus just a technical ratio: it is the maximum 
profit rate.17 
Now, it can be seen from chart 2 that the decline from 1965 to 1980, taken as a whole, 
would have happened whatever had happened to the profit share: since the maximum rate 
was falling, no reduction in wages, no matter how far, could possibly have restored the 
profit rate. The best that could have been achieved would have been to stave off the 
decline till 1970. 
Therefore Brenner’s ‘third explanation’ cannot be an alternative to a fall in the output-
capital ratio, and this is the difficulty. Since the output-capital ratio clearly is falling 
during the period of the decline, and moreover this fall explains virtually all the decline in 
the profit rate, there isn’t ‘room’ for an additional explanation. The explanation must in 
fact serve as the mechanism of the movement in the output-capital ratio, or as the 
outcome of some other mechanism which also causes the output-capital ratio to fall. If it 
really were a completely different cause, then when we eliminate the effect of the 
movement in the output-capital ratio – as we did in chart 1 – the variation due to the ‘third 
cause’ would be present in some way. 
The Scientific and the Religious method in Economics 
We now turn, finally, to the current state of economic theory. Empirically, the profit share 
theory is unacceptable, at least as an explanation for the movement of the profit rate. The 
evidence that the output-capital ratio is a dominant cause of the variation in the profit rate 
is overwhelming. 
If Okishio’s theorem prohibits this conclusion so much the worse for Okishio’s theorem, 
not to mention innumerable contributors to the Review of Radical Political Economy who 
uncritically and monotonously cite it as ‘evidence’ that Marx – the father of all output-
capital theories – must be wrong. 
When humans fail to accept what they see, no amount of illumination will improve 
matters. The searchlight must swerve: through a hundred and eighty degrees, from the 
external facts on which its operatives have trained it, to the internal world of these same 
operatives. The enquiry is no longer limited to what is observed. It must deal with the 
mind of the observer. 
The first theoretician to pose the question of the profit rate in terms of the ratio of total 
output to total capital invested was Ricardo. Ricardo’s explanation, which Brenner rightly 
in this case dubs ‘Malthusian’, was that output itself must be declining because of the 
declining marginal output of land. 
The whole of post-Ricardian theory revolves around a simple issue: is this the only way 
that output can decline? In this discussion, the most central issue of all is the 
interpretation of Ricardo’s most famous successor, Karl Marx. And the most central issue 
in this assessment is, in turn, was Marx merely a Ricardian? Does Marx’s reformulation 
of Ricardo’s theory of the profit rate merely restate it in rigorous terms, or does it involve 
                                                 
17
 Y/K may also be thought of as a multiple of the constant profit share profit rate. Chart 1 is what we get if 
we set any fixed value of the profit share and index the result to 1965=100. This could be any value. I 
happened to construct it by looking at rmax = Y/K where Y is output and K is capital stock; but if the profit 
share were equal to its average over the period, namely 33.6 per cent, this curve would be rconstant = 0.336Y/K, 
and when indexed to 1965=100 would look exactly the same.. 
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a theoretical innovation which would lead us to a different explanation for the decline in 
the profit rate from Ricardo’s? 
As we have seen, there is a different explanation. It is that the fall in value of invested 
capital, arising in turn from the declining prices of invested capital goods, constitutes a 
deduction from output so that the value or price rate of profit diverges systematically 
from the physical rate. 
The question is, did Marx understand this? Or to be more precise, is Marx’s theory open 
to an interpretation which integrates this insight? The answer has been provided by the 
work of the TSSI school, which has shown that indeed, the most transparent, obvious, 
simple and evidentially satisfactory interpretation of Marx is that his thinking, on 
economic theory, in fact diverges radically from that of most modern ‘Marxists’; that his 
account of the falling rate of profit is rooted in the recognition that temporal factors such 
as price (and value) movements over time play a decisive role in determining both the 
rate of profit, and the movement of the economy. 
At the very least, even for those who reject this interpretation, it must be conceded that 
this is a perfectly reasonable and valid way to understand Marx’s value theory. Thus, it 
must be conceded that explanations and theories are indeed accessible in the writings of 
the past, which provide a completely reasonable framework to understand the actual 
empirical movement of the rate of profit. Why, therefore, has economics not built on 
these completely reasonable, and empirically valid, theories? It is at this point we have to 
begin to grasp that the reaction of economics is not accidental, but constitutes an 
ideological response. 
Marx’s theory is held to be logically false by all modern economists, not least the 
Marxists, who in fact lead the charge. As noted, there is a flat contradiction between 
Okishio’s theorem and reality. It predicts a phenomenon – a rising output-capital ratio – 
which simply does not occur. Why then, does economics not simply scrap the theoretical 
framework of the Okishio theorem and start over? Because it has immunised itself against 
the obvious conclusion that an empirically false theorem is wrong. This is most clear in a 
remarkable passage from Roemer (1979:380), one of the two principal economists, as we 
have seen, on whom Brenner relies for his discounting of Marx’s empirically correct 
account: 
Responses to this claim, of Okishio and others, have been of three types. 
These are, first, what Fine and Harris (1976) call fundamentalist positions on 
FRP. Second, there are empirical discussions of whether or not the organic 
composition of capital is indeed rising. While this sort of investigation may 
be useful, it does not bear upon the theoretical issue of whether or not the rate 
of profit falls due to technical change. That is, either such investigation will 
be consistent with the Okishio conclusion, or it will not be; in the latter case, 
it would show the need for a different microeconomic argument of capitalist 
technical innovation; it would not, however, show Okishio’s argument to be 
wrong. The empirical investigations, then, are certainly necessary, but they 
cannot provide refutation of a theory. 
The idea that there exists a theory which cannot be refuted by empirical investigation is 
categorically false. No logical sleight of hand can rescue anyone who believes otherwise. 
Two centuries of historical experience have confirmed that Okishio’s theorem is factually 
false. My view is dogmatically straightforward: if theory does not match reality, the 
theory must be wrong, whether or not this theory contains within itself any clues as to 
how or why it is wrong. There are no exceptions. A discrepancy between observation and 
theory in every case informs that we should adjust our theory. Any other view is not 
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science but theology. There is no position more ‘fundamentalist’ than to assert that 
evidence cannot refute a theory. 
Roemer’s error goes to the heart of the question ‘why has economics failed?’ Actually, 
Okishio’s theorem is logically and mathematically impeccable. As a straightforward 
exercise in thought it is one of the great achievements of the second half of the century. 
But it is for this very reason that the underlying mistake in it must be much too profound 
to be solved by a ‘different microeconomic argument’ – by a theory that only rejigs 
models or mechanisms but does not seek out the underlying conceptual flaw which 
renders all such models incapable of predicting what actually in fact occurs. 
Consider, for example, how science finally reacted to the late 19th Century discovery that 
the speed of light in space is independent of the observer, which led to the theory of 
relativity. At the time, theory could not even explain why it had no explanation. It could 
do so only when Einstein showed that the error did not consist in a wrong ‘argument’, in a 
wrong set of equations linking ‘speed’, ‘space’ and ‘observer’, but in the actual meaning 
which thinkers had assigned to the words themselves. 
Pre-Einsteinian theorists, quite obviously, could not guess what Einstein was going to 
say. They were left simply with a contradiction between their theory and reality. However 
if they had declared that nevertheless the theory must be true, they would have ceased to 
operate as scientists.18 The fact that we do not know what is wrong with our theory does 
not excuse us from accepting that it is wrong. We cannot anticipate what future 
theoretical innovations will explain why we were wrong; we can, however, recognise that 
they will have to. This is not altered by our present inability to explain our failure. What 
outrageous vanity dares legislate against the future of thought? 
In the case of the profit rate, matters are far worse. Marx’s theory is not a future 
innovation. It is an existing account. If the economists cannot even adjust their thinking to 
understand why an existing theory explains reality better than their own – which is in 
essence what Roemer is saying – then they will make no further useful contribution to the 
advance of human knowledge no matter how profound their theoretical insights. 
This in turn explains why the recovery of Marx’s ‘own’ theory is indispensible – along 
with, of course, the ‘true’ theory in every account under consideration including, not least, 
Keynes’s original theory which has much in it, if prised loose from the hands of the 
Keynesians, that leads to an adequate understanding of the crisis of profitability. 
The motivation is not some obscure attachment to past doctrine but a realisation that 
present theory is so deeply incapable of understanding reality that we have to conclude it 
has organised itself to exclude precisely those insights that it needs to break out of its self-
constructed prison. It is precisely because Okishio’s theorem refutes Marx, but yet Marx 
is empirically correct, and because despite this fact economics has constructed a wall of 
censorship which excludes all empirically correct answers, that we cannot proceed until 
and unless we can find the insights that permitted the originators of those answers to 
reach their empirically valid analyses. 
The scientific procedure is this: if we cannot reconcile our thinking to reality, we must 
amend our thinking. The greater the contradiction, the more profound is the effort 
required. In fact we must do for economics what Einstein did for physics: Just as he 
reconstructed space and time, we have to reconstruct profit, price, and capital. We have to 
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 As some German theorists of the time actually did until the thirst for nuclear power asserted its domination 
over mere metaphysics: see for example the unlamented Hundert Autoren Gegen Einstein (Israel 1931),. 
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recognise that what is wrong is our very understanding of what these words mean. It 
requires in short the critical method. 
If our existing theory does not permit this reconstruction, so much the worse for theory. It 
shows only that our limited comprehension is so poor that we must root around in all our 
preconceptions until we have finally unlocked the secret prejudice which prevented us 
from understanding not only the world we live in, but why we could not understand it. 
The true fundamentalism is thus not that of the maligned capital logic school which, 
albeit somewhat bullheadedly, refused to abandon Marx’s explanation when economics 
proved it theoretically ‘wrong’. The ultimate dogmatism is that of those who, like Roemer 
– who is only one among many – refuse to ask how Marx got it empirically right. The 
only way to advance is to reject every ontological preconception which prevents us from 
seeing how the rise in capital stock really does outstrip the rise in output despite the 
unshakeable prejudice that this cannot occur. Everyone has three choices: abandon 
prejudice, abandon science, or abandon hope. 
Data sources 
Data for capital stock are taken from the Bureau of Economic Affairs publication Fixed 
tangible Wealth 1929-1996. Data for GDP, profits and wages are taken from the Bureau 
of Economic Affairs website which, at the time of writing, are given by the publication 
GDP 2004 revision with components. 
Capital stock is defined as the total of private fixed tangible assets (omitting government 
and private assets, which do not enter the equalisation of the profit rate), valued at current 
prices. GDP is the annual seasonally adjusted output also at current prices and wages are 
the compensation of employees, including employers’ contributions, at current prices. 
Profits, which are pre-tax, are defined as GDP less wages. 
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